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Abstract. In this paper, we derive bounds for profit maximizing prior-
free procurement auctions where a buyer wishes to procure multiple units
of a homogeneous item from n sellers who are strategic about their per
unit valuation. The buyer earns the profit by reselling these units in
an external consumer market. The paper looks at three scenarios of in-
creasing complexity : (1) sellers with unit capacities, (2) sellers with
non-unit capacities which are common knowledge, and (3) sellers with
non-unit capacities which are private to the sellers. First, we look at
unit capacity sellers where per unit valuation is private information of
each seller and the revenue curve is concave. For this setting, we define
two benchmarks. We show that no randomized prior free auction can be
constant competitive against any of these two benchmarks. However, for
a lightly constrained benchmark we design a prior-free auction PEPA
(Profit Extracting Procurement Auction) which is 4-competitive and we
show this bound is tight. Second, we study a setting where the sellers
have non-unit capacities that are common knowledge and derive similar
results. In particular, we propose a prior free auction PEPAC (Profit
Extracting Procurement Auction with Capacity) which is truthful for
any concave revenue curve. Third, we obtain results in the inherently
harder bi-dimensional case where per unit valuation as well as capacities
are private information of the sellers. We show that PEPAC is truthful
and constant competitive for the specific case of linear revenue curves.
We believe that this paper represents the first set of results on single
dimensional and bi-dimensional profit maximizing prior-free multi-unit
procurement auctions.
1 Introduction
Procurement auctions for awarding contracts to supply goods or services are
prevalent in many modern resource allocation situations. In several of these
scenarios, the buyer plays the role of an intermediary who purchases some goods
or services from the suppliers and resells it in the consumer market. For example,
in the retail sector, an intermediary procures products from different vendors
(perhaps through an auction) and resells it in consumer markets for a profit.
In a cloud computing setting [1], an intermediary buys cloud resources from
2different service providers (again through an auction) and resells these resources
to requesters of cloud services. The objective of the intermediaries in each of
these cases is to maximize the profit earned in the process of reselling.
Solving such problems via optimal auction of the kind discussed in the auc-
tion literature [2] inevitably requires assumption of a prior distribution on the
sellers’ valuations. The requirement of a known prior distribution often places
severe practical limitations. We have to be extremely careful in using a prior dis-
tribution which is collected from the past transactions of the bidders as they can
possibly manipulate to do something differently than before. Moreover, deciding
the prior distribution ideally requires a large number of samples. In reality, we
can only approximate it with a finite number of samples. Also, prior-dependent
auctions are non-robust: if the prior distribution alters, we are compelled to re-
peat the entire computation for the new prior, which is often computationally
hard. This motivates us to study prior-free auctions. In particular, in this paper,
we study profit maximizing prior-free procurement auctions with one buyer and
n sellers.
2 Prior Art and Contributions
The problem of designing a revenue-optimal auction was first studied by Myerson
[2]. Myerson considers the setting of a seller trying to sell a single object to one
of several possible buyers and characterizes all revenue-optimal auctions that are
BIC (Bayesian Incentive Compatible) and IIR (Interim individually Rational).
Dasgupta and Spulber [3] consider the problem of designing an optimal procure-
ment auction where suppliers have unlimited capacity. Iyengar and Kumar [4]
consider the setting where the buyer purchases multiple units of a single item
from the suppliers and resells it in the consumer market to earn some profit.
We consider the same setting here, however, we focus on the design of prior-free
auctions unlike the prior-dependent optimal auction designed in [4].
2.1 Related Work and Research Gaps
Goldberg et al. [5] initiated work on design of prior-free auctions and studied a
class of single-round sealed-bid auctions for an item in unlimited supply, such as
digital goods where each bidder requires at most one unit. They introduced the
notion of competitive auctions and proposed prior-free randomized competitive
auctions based on random sampling. In [6], the authors consider non-asymptotic
behavior of the random sampling optimal price auction (RSOP) and show that
its performance is within a large constant factor of a prior-free benchmark. Alaei
et al. [7] provide a nearly tight analysis of RSOP which shows that it is 4-
competitive for a large class of instances and 4.68 competitive for a much smaller
class of remaining instances. The competitive ratio has further been improved to
3.25 by Hartline and McGrew [8] and to 3.12 by Ichiba and Iwama [9]. Recently,
Chen et al. [10] designed an optimal competitive auction where the competitive
3ratio matches the lower bound of 2.42 derived in [6] and therefore settles an
important open problem in the design of digital goods auctions.
Beyond the digital goods setting, Devanur et al. [11] have studied prior-free
auctions under several settings such as multi-unit, position auctions, downward-
closed, and matroid environments. They design a prior-free auction with com-
petitive ratio of 6.24 for the multi-unit and position auctions using the 3.12
competitive auction for digital goods given in [9]. They also design an auction
with a competitive ratio of 12.5 for multi-unit settings by directly generalizing
the random sampling auction given in [6]. Our setting is different than the above
works on forward auction as we consider a procurement auction with capacitated
sellers.
Somewhat conceptually closer to our work is budget feasible mechanism de-
sign ([12], [13], [14], [15]) which models a simple procurement auction. Singer
[12] considers single-dimensional mechanisms that maximize the buyer’s valu-
ation function on subsets of items, under the constraint that the sum of the
payments provided by the mechanism does not exceed a given budget. Here the
objective is maximizing social welfare derived from the subset of items procured
under a budget and the benchmark considered is welfare optimal. On the other
hand, our work considers maximizing profit or revenue of the buyer which is fun-
damentally different from the previous objective and our benchmark is revenue
optimal. A simple example can be constructed to show that Singer’s benchmark
is not revenue optimal as follows. Suppose there is a buyer with budget $100
and valuation function V (k) = $25k (k is the number of items procured) and
5 sellers with costs $10, $20, $50, $60, and $70. Then Singer’s benchmark will
procure 3 items (with costs $10, $20, and $50) earning a negative utility to the
buyer which is welfare optimal but not revenue optimal as an omniscient revenue
maximizing allocation will procure 2 items (with costs $10 and $20) yielding a
revenue or utility of $20 to the buyer.
Although the design of prior-free auctions has generated wide interest in the
research community ([7], [10], [16], [11], [6], [5], [8], [9]) most of the works have
considered the forward setting. The reverse auction setting is subtly different
from forward auctions especially if the sellers are capacitated and the techniques
used for forward auctions cannot be trivially extended to the case of procurement
auctions. To the best of our knowledge, design of profit-maximizing prior-free
multi-unit procurement auctions is yet unexplored.
Moreover, the existing literature on prior-free auctions is limited to the single-
dimensional setting where each bidder has only one private type which is val-
uation per unit of an item. However, in a procurement auction, the sellers are
often capacitated and strategically report their capacities to increase their util-
ities. Therefore, the design of bi-dimensional prior-free procurement auctions is
extremely relevant in practice and in this paper, we believe we have derived the
first set of results in this direction.
42.2 Contributions
In this paper, we design profit-maximizing prior free procurement auctions where
a buyer procures multiple units of an item from n sellers and subsequently re-
sells the units to earn revenue. Our contributions are three-fold. First, we look at
unit capacity sellers and define two benchmarks for analyzing the performance
of any prior-free auction – (1) an optimal single price auction (F) and (2) an
optimal multi-price auction (T ). We show that no prior-free auction can be con-
stant competitive against any of the two benchmarks. We then consider a lightly
relaxed benchmark (F (2)) which is constrained to procure at least two units
and design a prior-free auction PEPA (Profit Extracting Procurement Auction)
which is 4-competitive against (F (2)) for any concave revenue curve. Second,
we study a setting where the sellers have non-unit capacities that are common
knowledge and derive similar results. In particular, we propose a prior free auc-
tion PEPAC (Profit Extracting Procurement Auction with Capacity) which is
truthful for any concave revenue curve. Third, we obtain results in the inherently
harder bi-dimensional case where per unit valuation as well as capacities are pri-
vate information of the sellers. We show that PEPAC is truthful and constant
competitive for the specific case of linear revenue curves.
We believe the proposed auctions represent the first effort in single dimen-
sional and bi-dimensional prior-free multi-unit procurement auctions. Further,
these auctions can be easily adapted in real-life procurement situations due to
the simple rules and prior-independence of the auctions.
3 Sellers with Unit Capacities
We consider a single round procurement auction setting with one buyer (retailer,
intermediary etc.) and n sellers where each seller has a single unit of a homoge-
neous item. The buyer procures multiple units of the item from the sellers and
subsequently resells it in an outside consumer market, earning a revenue of R(q)
from selling q units of the item. We assume that the revenue curve of the outside
market R(q) is concave with R(0) = 0. This is motivated by the following stan-
dard argument from economics. According to the law of demand, the quantity
demanded decreases as price per unit increases. It can be easily shown that the
marginal revenue falls with an increase in the number of units sold and so the
revenue curve is concave.
3.1 Procurement Auction
We assume that the buyer (auctioneer) has unlimited demand, but as each seller
(bidder) has unit capacity, the number of units the buyer can procure and resell
is limited by the total number of sellers. We make the following assumptions
about the bidders:
1. Each bidder has a private valuation vi which represents the true minimum
amount he is willing to receive to sell a single unit of the item.
52. Bidders’ valuations are independently and identically distributed.
3. Utility of a bidder is given as payment minus valuation.
In reference to the revelation principle [2], we will restrict our attention to
single-round, sealed-bid, truthful auctions. Now we define the notions of single-
round sealed-bid auction, bid-independent auction, and competitive auction for
our setting.
Single-round Sealed-bid Auction (A).
1. The bid submitted by bidder i is bi. The vector of all the submitted bids is
denoted by b. Let b−i denote the masked vector of bids where bi is removed
from b.
2. Given the bid vector b and the revenue curve R, the auctioneer computes
an allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn), and payments p = (p1, . . . , pn). If bidder i
sells the item, xi = 1 and we say bidder i wins. Otherwise, bidder i loses
and xi = 0. The auctioneer pays an amount pi to bidder i. We assume that
pi ≥ bi for all winning bidders and pi = 0 for all losing bidders.
3. The auctioneer resells the units bought from the sellers in the outside con-
sumer market. The profit of the auction (or auctioneer) is given by,
A(b,R) = R(
∑n
i=1 xi(b,R))−
∑n
i=1 pi(b,R).
The auctioneer wishes to maximize her profit satisfying IR (Individual Ra-
tionality) and DSIC (Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility). As bidding
vi is a dominant strategy for bidder i in a truthful auction, in the remainder of
this paper, we assume that bi = vi.
Bid-independent Auction. An auction is bid-independent if the offered pay-
ment to a bidder is independent of the bidder’s bid. It can certainly depend on
the bids of the other bidders and the revenue curve. Such an auction is deter-
mined by a function f (possibly randomized) which takes the masked bid vectors
and the revenue curve as input and maps it to payments which are non-negative
real numbers. Let Af (b,R) denote the bid-independent auction defined by f .
For each bidder i the allocation and payments are determined in two phases as
follows :
1. Phase I :
(a) ti ← f(b−i,R).
(b) If ti < bi, set xi ← 0, pi ← 0, and remove bidder i.
Suppose n′ is the number of bidders left. Let t[i] denote the i
th lowest value
of tj among the remaining n
′ bidders. Let x[i] and p[i] be the corresponding
allocation and payment. Now we choose the allocation that maximizes the
revenue of the buyer.
2. Phase II :
(a) k ← argmax
0≤i≤n′
(R(i)−
∑i
j=1 t[j]).
6(b) Set x[i] ← 1 and p[i] ← t[i] for i = {1, . . . , k}.
(c) Otherwise, set x[i] ← 0, p[i] ← 0.
For any bid-independent auction, the allocation of bidder i is non-increasing
in valuation vi and his payment is independent of his bid. It follows from Myer-
son’s characterization [2] of truthful auctions that any bid-independent auction
is truthful.
Competitive Auction. In the absence of any prior distribution over the val-
uations of the bidders, we cannot compare the profit of a procurement auction
with respect to the average profit of the optimal auction. Rather, we measure
the performance of a truthful auction on any bid by comparing it with the profit
that would have been achieved by an omniscient optimal auction (OPT ), the op-
timal auction which knows all the true valuations in advance without requiring
to elicit them from the bidders.
Definition 1. β-competitive auction (β > 1) : An auction A is β-competitive
against OPT if for all bid vectors b, the expected profit of A on b satisfies
E[A(b,R)] ≥
OPT (b,R)
β
.
We refer to β as the competitive ratio of A. Auction A is competitive if its
competitive ratio β is a constant.
3.2 Prior-Free Benchmarks
As a first step in comparing the performance of any prior-free procurement
auction, we need to come up with the right metric for comparison that is a
benchmark. It is important that we choose such a benchmark carefully for such
a comparison to be meaningful. Here, we start with the strongest possible bench-
mark for comparison: the profit of an auctioneer who knows the bidder’s true
valuations. This leads us to consider the two most natural metrics for comparison
– the optimal multiple price and single price auctions. We compare the perfor-
mances of truthful auctions to that of the optimal multiple price and single price
auctions. Let v[i] denote the i-th lowest valuation.
Optimal Single Price Auction (F). Let b be a bid vector. Auction F on
input b determines the value k such that R(k)− kv[k] is maximized. All bidders
with bid bi ≤ v[k] win at price v[k]; all remaining bidders lose. We denote the
optimal procurement price for b that gives the optimal profit by OPP (b,R).
The profit of F on input b is denoted by F(b,R). So we have,
F(b,R) = max
0≤i≤n
(R(i)− iv[i]).
OPP (b,R) = argmax
v[i]
(R(i)− iv[i]).
7Optimal Multiple Price Auction (T ). Auction T buys from each bidder
at her bid value. So auction T on input b determines the value l such that
R(l)−
∑l
i=1 v[i] is maximized. First l bidders win at their bid value; all remaining
bidders lose. The profit of T on input b is given by
T (b,R) = max
0≤i≤n
(R(i)−
∑i
j=1 v[j]).
It is clear that T (b,R) ≥ F(b,R) for any bid vector b and any revenue
curve R. However, F does not perform very poorly compared to T . We prove
a bound between the performance of F and T . Specifically, we observe that in
the worst case, the maximum ratio of T to F is logarithmic in the number n of
bidders.
Lemma 1. For any b and any concave revenue curve R,
F(b,R) ≥
T (b,R)
ln n
.
Proof: We use the following property of concave function,
R(i)
i
≥
R(j)
j
∀i ≤ j.
Suppose T buys k units and F buys l units from the sellers.
T (b,R) = R(k)−
k∑
i=1
v[i] =
k∑
i=1
(
R(k)
k
− v[i]
)
≤
k∑
i=1
(
R(i)
i
− v[i]
)
≤
k∑
i=1
R(l)− lv[l]
i
≤ F(b,R)(ln n+ O(1)).

The result implies that if an auction A is constant-competitive against F then
it is lnn competitive against T . Now we show that no truthful auction can be
constant-competitive against F and hence it cannot be competitive against T .
Theorem 1. For any truthful auction Af , any revenue curve R, and any β ≥ 1,
there exists a bid vector b such that the expected profit of Af on b is at most
F(b,R)/β.
Proof: Consider a bid-independent randomized auction Af on two bids, r and
L < r where r = R(1). Suppose g and G denote the probability density function
and cumulative density function of the random variable f(r,R). We fix one bid
at r and choose L depending on the two cases.
1. Case I : G(r) ≤ 1/β. We choose L =
r
β
.
Then F(b,R) = r
(
1−
1
β
)
and E[Af (b,R)] ≤
1
β
(
r −
r
β
)
=
F(b,R)
β
.
82. Case II : G(r) > 1/β. We choose L = r− ǫ such that G(r)−G(r− ǫ) < 1/β.
As G is a non-decreasing function and G(r) > 1/β such a value of ǫ always
exists. Then F(b,R) = r − (r − ǫ) = ǫ and
E[Af (b,R)] =
∫ r
r−ǫ
(r − y)g(y)dy
≤ r
∫ r
r−ǫ
g(y)dy − (r − ǫ)
∫ r
r−ǫ
g(y)dy
= ǫ
∫ r
r−ǫ
g(y)dy = ǫ(G(r) −G(r − ǫ))
<
ǫ
β
=
F(b,R)
β
.

Theorem 1 shows that we cannot match the performance of the optimal single
price auction when the optimal profit is generated from the single lowest bid.
Therefore we present an auction that is competitive against F (2), the optimal
single price auction that buys at least two units. Such an auction achieves a
constant fraction of the revenue of F (2) on all inputs.
An Auction F that Procures at least Two Units (F(2)). Let b be a bid
vector. Auction F (2) on input b determines the value k ≥ 2 such thatR(k)−kv[k]
is maximized. The profit of F (2) on input b is
F (2)(b,R) = max
2≤i≤n
(R(i)− iv[i]).
Note that, though F (2) is slightly constrained the performance of F (2) can be
arbitrarily bad in comparison to F . We demonstrate it using a simple example
where F procures only one unit as follows.
Example 1. Consider the revenue curve R(k) = rk (r > 0). Let 0 < ǫ ≪ r
and bid vector b = (ǫ, r − ǫ, r, . . . , r). Then, F(b,R) = r − ǫ and F (2)(b,R) =
2r − 2(r − ǫ) = 2ǫ. Hence,
F(b,R)
F (2)(b,R)
=
r − ǫ
2ǫ
=
(
r
2ǫ
−
1
2
)
→∞ as ǫ→ 0.
But if F chooses to buy at least two units, we have F (2)(b,R) = F(b,R). Thus,
comparing auction performance to F (2) is identical to comparing it to F if we
exclude the bid vectors where only the lowest bidder wins in the optimal auction.
From now on, we say an auction is β-competitive if it is β-competitive against
F (2).
3.3 Profit Extracting Procurement Auction (PEPA)
We now present a prior-free procurement auction based on random sampling.
Our auction takes the bids from the bidders and then partitions them into two
9sets by flipping a fair coin for each bid to decide to which partition to assign
it. Then we use one partition for market analysis and utilize what we learn
from a sub-auction on the other partition, and vice versa. We extend the profit
extraction technique of [6]. The goal of the technique is, given b, R, and profit
P , to find a subset of bidders who generate profit P .
Profit Extraction (PEP (b,R)). Given target profit P ,
1. Find the largest value of k for which v[k] is at most (R(k) − P )/k.
2. Pay these k bidders (R(k) − P )/k and reject others.
Profit Extracting Procurement Auction (PEPA).
1. Partition the bids b uniformly at random into two sets b′ and b′′: for each
bid, flip a fair coin, and with probability 1/2 put the bid in b′ and otherwise
in b′′.
2. Compute F ′ = F(b′,R) and F ′′ = F(b′′,R) which are the optimal single
price profits for b′ and b′′ respectively.
3. Compute the auction results of PEF ′′(b
′, R) and PEF ′(b
′′, R).
4. Run the auction PEF ′′(b
′, R) or PEF ′(b
′′, R) that gives higher profit to the
buyer. Ties are broken arbitrarily.
The following lemmas can be easily derived.
Lemma 2. PEPA is truthful.
Lemma 3. PEPA has profit F ′ if F ′ = F ′′; otherwise it has profit min(F ′, F ′′).
Now we derive the competitive ratio for PEPA, first for linear revenue curve and
then for any arbitrary concave revenue curve.
Theorem 2. PEPA is 4-competitive if the revenue curve is linear i.e. R(k) = rk
where r > 0 and this bound is tight.
Proof: By definition, F (2) on b buys from k ≥ 2 bidders for a profit of F (2)(b,R) =
R(k) − kv[k]. These k bidders are divided uniformly at random between b
′ and
b′′. Let k1 be the number of them in b
′ and k2 the number in b
′′. Now we
denote the ith lowest bid in b′ by v′[i] and in b
′′ by v′′[i]. Clearly, v
′
[k1]
≤ v[k]
and v′′[k2] ≤ v[k]. So we have, F
′ ≥ R(k1) − k1v
′
[k1]
≥ R(k1) − k1v[k] and
F ′′ ≥ R(k2)− k2v
′′
[k2]
≥ R(k2)− k2v[k].
min(F ′, F ′′)
F (2)(b,R)
≥
min(R(k1)− k1v[k],R(k2)− k2v[k])
R(k)− kv[k]
=
min(rk1 − k1v[k], rk2 − k2v[k])
rk − kv[k]
=
min(k1, k2)
k
.
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Thus, the competitive ratio is given by
E[P ]
F (2)
=
1
k
k−1∑
i=1
min(i, k − i)
(
k
i
)
2−k =
1
2
−
(
k − 1
⌊k/2⌋
)
2−k. (1)
The above expression achieves its minimum of 1/4 for k = 2 and k = 3. As k
increases it approaches 1/2. 
Example 2. The bound presented on the competitive ratio is tight. Consider the
revenue curveR(k) = 2lk (l > 0) and bid vector b which consists of two bids l−ǫ
and l. All other bids are very high compared to l. Then, F(b,R) = F (2)(b,R) =
2l. The expected profit of PEPA is l · P [two low bids are split between b′ and
b′′] = l/2 = F(b,R)/4.
Theorem 3. For any concave revenue curve, PEPA is 4-competitive.
Proof: Using notation defined above,
min(F ′, F ′′)
F (2)(b,R)
≥
min(R(k1)− k1v[k],R(k2)− k2v[k])
R(k)− kv[k]
=
min(k1(
R(k1)
k1
− v[k]), k2(
R(k2)
k2
− v[k]))
k(R(k)
k
− v[k])
≥
min(k1(
R(k)
k
− v[k]), k2(
R(k)
k
− v[k]))
k(R(k)
k
− v[k])
=
min(k1, k2)
k
≥ 1/4.

4 Sellers with Non-Unit Non-Strategic Capacities
4.1 Setup
Now we consider the setting where sellers can supply more than one unit of an
item. Seller i has valuation per unit vi and a maximum capacity qi where vi is a
positive real number and qi is a positive integer. In other words, each seller can
supply at most qi units of a homogeneous item. We assume that the sellers are
strategic with respect to valuation per unit only and they always report their
capacities truthfully. Let xi and pi denote the allocation and per unit payment
to bidder i. Then the profit of the auction (or auctioneer) for bid vector b is
A(b,R) = R(
n∑
i=1
xi(b,R))−
n∑
i=1
pi(b,R) · xi(b,R).
The auctioneer wants to maximize her profit satisfying feasibility, IR, and DSIC.
As before, we first define the notion of bid-independent auction for this setting.
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Bid-independent Auction. For each bidder i, the allocation and payments
are determined in two phases as follows.
1. Phase I :
(a) ti ← f(b−i,R).
(b) If ti < vi, set xi ← 0, pi ← 0, and remove bidder i.
(c) Let n′ be the number of remaining bidders.
2. Phase II :
(a) i′ ← argmax
0≤i≤m′

R(i)− k−1∑
j=1
q[j]t[j] − (i−
k−1∑
j=1
q[j])t[k]


where m′ =
∑n′
j=1 q[j] and
∑k−1
j=1 q[j] < i ≤
∑k
j=1 q[j]
(b) Suppose k′ satisfies
∑k′−1
j=1 q[j] < i
′ ≤
∑k′
j=1 q[j].
(c) Set x[i] ← q[i] and p[i] ← t[i] for i = {1, . . . , k
′ − 1}.
(d) Set x[k′ ] ← (i
′ −
∑k′−1
j=1 q[j]) and p[k′] ← t[k′].
(e) Otherwise, set x[i] ← 0, p[i] ← 0.
As the allocation is monotone in bids and payment is bid-independent, any bid-
independent auction is truthful.
4.2 Prior-Free Benchmark
We denote the i-th lowest valuation by v[i] and the corresponding capacity by
q[i]. Suppose m =
∑n
i=1 qi. Then we have,
F(b,R) = max
0≤i≤m
(R(i)− iv[j]), where
∑j−1
k=1 q[k] < i ≤
∑j
k=1 q[k]
OPP (b,R) = argmax
v[j]
(
max∑j−1
k=1 q[k]<i≤
∑j
k=1 q[k]
(R(i)− iv[j])
)
The first j bidders are the winners and they are allocated at their full capacity
except possibly the last one. As no truthful auction can be constant-competitive
against F we define F (2) as the optimal single price auction that buys from at
least two bidders. The profit of F (2) on input vector b is
F (2)(b,R) = max
q[1]<i≤m
(R(i)− iv[j]), where
∑j−1
k=1 q[k] < i ≤
∑j
k=1 q[k]
4.3 Profit Extracting Procurement Auction with Capacity
(PEPAC)
Now we extend the random sampling based procurement auction presented in
Section 3.3 for this setting.
Profit Extraction with Capacity (PECP (b,R)).
1. Find the largest value of k′ for which v[k] is at most (R(k
′) − P )/k′ where∑k−1
i=1 q[i] < k
′ ≤
∑k
i=1 q[i].
2. Pay these k bidders (R(k′)− P )/k′ per unit and reject others.
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Profit Extracting Procurement Auction with Capacity (PEPAC). PEPAC
is same as PEPA except that it invokes PECP (b,R) instead of PEP (b,R). Next
we derive the performance of PEPAC through the following theorems.
Theorem 4. PEPAC is 4-competitive for any concave revenue curve R if
qi = q ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof: By definition, F (2) on b buys from k ≥ 2 bidders for a profit of F (2)(b,R) =
R(k′) − k′v[k] where
∑k−1
i=1 q < k
′ ≤
∑k
i=1 q These k bidders are divided uni-
formly at random between b′ and b′′. Let k1 be the number of them in b
′ and
k2 the number in b
′′. Now we denote the ith lowest bid in b′ by v′[i] and in b
′′ by
v′′[i]. Clearly, v
′
[k1]
≤ v[k] and v
′′
[k2]
≤ v[k]. As F
′ and F ′′ are optimal in respective
partitions we have,
F ′ ≥ R(k1q)− k1qv
′
[k1]
≥ R(k1q)− k1qv[k].
F ′′ ≥ R(k2q)− k2qv
′′
[k2]
≥ R(k2q)− k2qv[k].
Auction profit is P = min(F ′, F ′′). Therefore,
min(F ′, F ′′)
F (2)(b,R)
≥
min(R(k1q)− k1qv[k],R(k2q)− k2qv[k])
R(k′)− k′v[k]
=
min(k1q(
R(k1q)
k1q
− v[k]), k2q(
R(k2q)
k2q
− v[k]))
k′(R(k
′)
k′
− v[k])
≥
min(k1q(
R(k′)
k′
− v[k]), k2q(
R(k′)
k′
− v[k]))
k′(R(k
′)
k′
− v[k])
[as
R(k1q)
k1q
≥
R(k′)
k′
and
R(k2q)
k2q
≥
R(k′)
k′
]
=
min(k1q, k2q)
k′
≥
min(k1q, k2q)
kq
=
min(k1, k2)
k
.
Thus, the competitive ratio is given by
E[P ]
F (2)
=
1
k
k−1∑
i=1
min(i, k − i)
(
k
i
)
2−k
=
1
2
−
(
k − 1
⌊k/2⌋
)
2−k.
which is the same as in Theorem 2. 
Theorem 5. PEPAC is 4 ·
(
qmax
qmin
)
-competitive if the revenue curve is linear
and qi ∈ [qmin, qmax] ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and further this bound is tight.
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Proof: By definition, F (2) on b buys from k ≥ 2 bidders for a profit of F (2)(b,R) =
R(k′)− k′v[k] where
∑k−1
i=1 q[i] < k
′ ≤
∑k
i=1 q[i] These k bidders are divided uni-
formly at random between b′ and b′′. Let k1 be the number of bidders in b
′ and
k2 the number in b
′′. Now we denote the ith lowest bid (according to valuation)
in b′ by (v′[i], q
′
[i]) and in b
′′ by (v′′[i], q
′′
[i]). Clearly, v
′
[k1]
≤ v[k] and v
′′
[k2]
≤ v[k].
As F ′ and F ′′ are optimal in respective partitions we have,
F ′ ≥ R(
k1∑
i=1
q′[i])− (
k1∑
i=1
q′[i])v[k], F
′′ ≥ R(
k2∑
i=1
q′′[i])− (
k2∑
i=1
q′′[i])v[k].
Suppose
k1∑
i=1
q′[i] = qx,
k2∑
i=1
q′′[i] = qy, and
k∑
i=1
q[i] = qz.
min(F ′, F ′′)
F (2)(b,R)
≥
min(R(qx)− qxv[k],R(qy)− qyv[k])
R(k′)− k′v[k]
=
min(rqx − qxv[k], rqy − qyv[k])
rk′ − k′v[k]
=
min(qx, qy)
k′
≥
min(qx, qy)
qz
≥
min(k1qmin, k2qmin)
kqmax
=
(
qmin
qmax
)
min(k1, k2)
k
≥
qmin
4 · qmax
.

Theorem 6. PEPAC is 4 ·
(
qmax
qmin
)
-competitive for any concave revenue curve
R if qi ∈ [qmin, qmax] ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
5 Sellers with Non-Unit Strategic Capacities
5.1 Setup
In this case, seller i can misreport his capacity qi in addition to misreporting his
valuation per unit vi to maximize his gain from the auction. Here, we assume
that sellers are not allowed to overbid their capacity. This can be enforced by
declaring, as part of the auction, that if a seller fails to provide the number of
units he has bid, he suffers a huge penalty (financial or legal loss). But under-
bidding may help a seller as depending on the mechanism it may result in an
increase in the payment which can often more than compensate the loss due to
a decrease in allocation. Hence, as shown by Iyengar and Kumar [4], even when
the bidders can only underbid their capacities, an auction that simply ignores
the capacities of the bidders need not be incentive compatible. A small example
can be constructed as follows.
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Example 3. Suppose the (vi, qi) values of the sellers are (6, 100), (8, 100), (10, 200)
and (12, 100). Consider an external market with maximum demand of 200 units.
The revenue curve is given by R(j) = 15j when j <= 200 and 15 ∗ 200 when
j > 200. Suppose the buyer conducts the classic Kth price auction where the
payment to a winning seller is equal to the valuation of the first losing seller.
Bidding valuation truthfully is a weekly dominant strategy of the sellers but it
does not deter them from possibly altering their capacities. If they report both
vi and qi truthfully the allocation will be (100, 100, 0, 0) and the utility of the
second seller will be (10−8)∗100 = 200. If the second seller underbids his capac-
ity to 90 the allocation changes to (100, 90, 10, 0) and the utility of the second
seller will be (12−8)∗90 = 360. So the Kth price auction is clearly not incentive
compatible.
Note that the actual values of bi = (vi, qi) are known to only seller i. From
now on, the true type of each bidder is represented by bi = (vi, qi) and each
reported bid is represented by bˆi = (vˆi, qˆi). So we denote the true type vector
by b and the reported bid vector by bˆ. We denote the utility or true surplus
of bidder i by ui(bˆ,R) and the offered surplus by uˆi(bˆ,R). True surplus is the
pay-off computed using the true valuation and the offered surplus is the pay-off
computed using the reported valuation.
ui(bˆ,R) = [pi(bˆ,R)xi(bˆ,R)− vixi(bˆ,R)].
uˆi(bˆ,R) = [pi(bˆ,R)xi(bˆ,R)− vˆixi(bˆ,R)].
5.2 A Characterization of DSIC and IR Procurement Auctions
Iyengar and Kumar [4] have characterized all DSIC and IR procurement auctions
and the payment rule that implements a given DSIC allocation rule.
1. A feasible allocation rule x is DSIC if, and only if, xi(((vi, qi), bˆ−i),R) is
non-increasing in vi, ∀qi, ∀bˆ−i.
2. A mechanism (x, p) is DSIC and IR if, and only if, the allocation rule x
satisfies 1 and the ex-post offered surplus is
uˆi(bˆi, bˆ−i,R) =
∫ ∞
vˆi
xi(u, qˆi, bˆ−i,R)du.
with uˆi((vˆi, qˆi), bˆ−i,R) non-negative and non-decreasing in qˆi for all vˆi and
for all bˆ−i.
We use the same prior-free benchmark and the random sampling procurement
auction as defined in Section 4 and extend our previous results for strategic
capacity case.
Lemma 4. PECP is truthful if R is linear.
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Proof: Let k1 and k2 be the number of units PECP procures from the bidders to
achieve target profit P when bidders report their capacities truthfully and mis-
report their capacities respectively. By our assumption bidders are only allowed
to underbid their capacities. So we have k2 ≤ k1. Now truthful reporting is a
dominant strategy of the bidders if the bidders are not better off by underbid-
ding their capacities. So qˆi ≤ qi and ui(((vi, qˆi), bˆ−i),R) ≤ ui(((vi, qi), bˆ−i),R).
Hence we have,
−viqˆi + qˆi
R(k2)− P
k2
≤ −viqi + qi
R(k1)− P
k1
.
A sufficient condition for the above inequality to hold is
R(k2)− P
k2
≤
R(k1)− P
k1
∀k2 ≤ k1.
Clearly a linear revenue curve satisfies the above sufficient condition. 
The following results immediately follow from the above lemma.
Theorem 7. PEPAC is truthful if R is linear.
Theorem 8. PEPAC is 4-competitive if the revenue curve R is linear and
qi = q ∀ i = {1, . . . , n}.
Theorem 9. PEPAC is 4 ·
(
qmax
qmin
)
-competitive for any linear revenue curve R
if qi ∈ [qmin, qmax] ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have considered a model of prior-free profit-maximizing pro-
curement auctions with capacitated sellers and designed prior-free auctions for
both single dimensional and bi-dimensional sellers. We have shown that the op-
timal single price auction cannot be matched by any truthful auction. Hence, we
have considered a lightly constrained single price auction as our benchmark in
the analysis. We have presented procurement auctions based on profit extraction,
PEPA for sellers with unit capacity and PEPAC for sellers with non-unit capacity
and proved an upper bound on their competitive ratios. For the bi-dimensional
case, PEPAC is truthful for the specific case of linear revenue curves. Our major
future work is to design a prior-free auction for bi-dimensional sellers which is
truthful and competitive for all concave revenue curves. Subsequently, we would
like to design prior-free procurement auctions for the more generic setting where
each seller can announce discounts based on the volume of supply.
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